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This  paper  studies  the  effect  of  leadership  on  the  level  and  evolution  of  pro-social  behavior  using  an 
artefactual field experiment on local public good provision. Participants decide how much to contribute to an 
actual conservation project. They can then revise their donations after being randomly matched in pairs on 
the basis of their authority and having observed each other’s contributions.  Authority is measured through a 
social ranking exercise identifying formal and moral leaders within the community. I find that giving by a 
pair is higher and shows a lower tendency to decrease over time when a leader is part of a pair. This is 
because higher-ranked pair members in general, and leaders in particular, donate more and are less likely to 
revise contributions downwards after giving more than their counterparts. Leadership effects are stronger 
when moral authority is made salient within the experiment, in line with the ethical nature of the decision 
under  study.  These  findings  highlight  the  importance  of  identifying  different  forms  of  leadership  and 
targeting the relevant leaders in projects aimed at local public good provision.  
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1. Introduction 
Public good provision is a crucial element for the functioning of every social group. Social dilemmas, i.e. 
situations in which individuals who would benefit from the provision of the public good find it costly to 
contribute and would prefer to free-ride on others’ contributions, are common in this context and often lead 
to the under-provision of public goods and services. Solutions to social dilemmas relying on governmental 
interventions  and  privatization  are  often  unfeasible,  especially  in  developing  countries,  as  they  require 
prohibitive amounts of resources and institutional capacity. Groups facing social dilemmas must frequently 
rely on informal solutions, designed and managed by users themselves. 
Leadership is a potential solution to many important cooperation problems. Aside from the formal 
authority and sanctioning power often held by leaders, their ability to set an example and urge action can 
potentially  mitigate  free-riding,  coordinate  expectations,  and  otherwise  encourage  particular  behaviors 
among followers. The potential value of leadership is further evident in the fact that most groups, teams and 
organizations  function  with  some  kind  of  leadership  structure,  even  when  it  holds  little  or  no  formal 
authority. This paper examines the role of leadership in promoting the provision of local public goods. In 
particular, it investigates whether leaders’ example can lead to higher aggregate contributions to public 
goods, and sustain cooperation over time. Moreover, this study asks how leaders’ effectiveness depends on 
the type of authority they hold within the group.  
This  paper  focuses  on  a  particular  type  of  public  good,  i.e.  environmental  conservation. 
Environmental  problems  are  of  particular  interest  as  social  dilemmas,  because  users  have  no  perfect 
knowledge of the consequences of their resource extraction choices on natural resources’ rates of depletion, 
and this uncertainty reinforces individuals’ tendency to over-exploit them.  Moreover, research on how to 
foster conservation of common property resources can have a large impact on development and poverty 
reduction, as the poor rely heavily on this type of public goods - such as fresh water, pastures and forests - 
for  their  livelihoods  and  are  severely  exposed  to  environmental  shocks.  Women  and  children  are  most 
vulnerable to under-provision of these resources, the consequences of which they bear in terms of food 
security and time allocation between resource collection and productive activities.   
The  fieldwork  for  this  study  took  place  in  a  rural  area  of  Northern  Colombia,  where  over-
exploitation  of  local  ecosystems  has  led  to  the  rapid  loss  of  traditional  sources  of  people’s  livelihood. 
Participants in the study were asked to make a donation to a biodiversity conservation project. They could 
revise their donation choices after observing the amount given by another participant, with whom they were 
randomly paired. The design of the study varied the leadership status of the person whose choices were 
observed. Leadership was defined through a collective ranking exercise, in which participants were divided 
in  three  groups  -  top,  medium  and  bottom  -  depending  on  their  leadership  qualities  along  different 
dimensions.  Using  data  from  the  experiment,  it  is  therefore  possible  to  observe  how  participants’ 
contribution and revision choices varied depending on their own position within the ranking, on the position 
of their experimental partners, and on the dimension of leadership along which relative ranking was defined.   3 
The  empirical  analysis  yields  the  following  main  results.  First,  total  contribution  by  a  pair  is 
significantly higher when the pair includes at least one leader. This difference is driven by the fact that 
leaders contribute more to environmental conservation, and not by the fact that lower-ranked participants 
donate significantly more when paired with leaders. Higher contributions by leaders are a consequence of 
two mechanisms: leaders value environmental conservation more; and the same person donates on average 
more, the higher her relative status within the pair. This result is consistent with previous findings in the 
leadership literature and with the idea that higher-ranked individuals feel a responsibility as role models for 
lower-ranked ones.  
Second, type of authority matters. In particular, aggregate contributions are on average higher when 
leadership is defined along the moral dimension, rather than along the formal one. This result is interpreted 
as evidence of the fact that environmental conservation decisions fall predominantly within the realm of 
ethical norms.  
Third, total contribution by a pair is also more stable over time when the pair includes at least one 
leader.  Consistent  with  experimental studies  on  public  good  provision,  cooperation in  pairs that  do not 
include a leader tends to unravel over time, as individuals conform more strongly to others’ choices when 
doing so entails a reduction in giving. The presence of a leader within a pair offsets this tendency, because 
leaders do not reduce giving when exposed to partners who donate less than they do. Once again, this pattern 
results  from  a  general  negative  correlation  between  relative  status  and  tendency  to  conform,  which  is 
particularly strong among leaders. This finding is consistent with sociological theories of social comparison, 
which claim that individuals look up on the status ladder when determining the appropriateness of their 
conduct. 
This  paper  makes  a  series  of  contributions  to  the  existing  literature  on  leadership  and  social 
influence. First, the use of an artefactual field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004) makes it possible for this 
study to investigate the effect of leadership on donations to an actual public good. The use of a real world 
sample has shortcomings, first of all the loss of experimental control, but allows to investigate whether 
leadership effects observed in the laboratory with student samples are generalizable and empirically relevant 
in natural and policy relevant settings.  
A second contribution of this research is its focus on existing leaders. Laboratory experiments on 
leadership typically assign status to participants either on the basis of their performance in small tasks within 
the laboratory, or randomly. This approach is chosen because it allows to cleanly evaluate the effect of 
(exogenously assigned) status on behavior. The approach adopted in this paper is complementary, in that it 
makes  salient  within  the  experiment  the  status  with  which  individuals  are  endowed  on  the  basis  of 
characteristics they possess outside of the experiment. In doing so, this study can assess the relationship 
between long term determinants of leadership and individual behavior, and the effect of naturally occurring 
leadership on followers’ choices.  
A third novel element of this paper is its analysis of different dimensions of leadership: formal, moral 
and traditional. Participants within the experiment were ranked according to these three types of authority, so   4 
that  it  is  possible  to  compare  the  behavior  of  those  classified  as  leaders  and  non-leaders  according  to 
different criteria. Acknowledging the potential role of different types of leadership is particularly relevant in 
developing countries, where formal powers often co-exist with traditional structures of authority. In these 
settings, it is not obvious that rules of conduct established by formal leaders will be the most influential. This 
study  is  the  first  attempt  at  comparing  the  effect  of  different  forms  of  leadership  in  fostering  group 
cooperation. Finally, the design of the experiment is such that one can observe how giving evolves over time. 
Existing  field  studies  on  the  effect  that  information  about  others  people’s  choices  has  on  individuals’ 
decisions to donate to charity typically investigate one-shot decision environments. This study complements 
the findings of this literature and tests their robustness in a dynamic setting. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, an overview of the relevant literature on 
leadership, status and pro-social behavior is presented (Section 2). Then  Section 3 describes the setting and 
main features of the experimental design. Section 4 spells out the main hypotheses that are then tested in the 
empirical  analysis  (Section  5).  A  series  of  robustness  checks  is  conducted  in  Section  6. The  ability  of 
different theoretical perspectives to account for the empirical findings is discussed, and evidence is offered in 
favor or against specific explanations (Section 7). A discussion of policy implications, limits to external 
validity and directions for further research concludes (Section 8). 
 
2. Related literature 
Large literatures outside economics investigate the role of high status individuals in general, and leaders 
more  specifically,  in  shaping  collective  outcomes.  In  economics,  the  study  of  leadership  has  received 
considerably less explicit attention. A small number of theoretical papers explore leadership in organizations 
(Hermalin, 1998; Komai, et al., 2007), and a growing stream of empirical research attempts to assess whether 
leadership has effects on outcomes such as economic growth (Jones & Olken, 2005), the provision of public 
goods (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004), and firm profitability (Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Other empirical 
papers attempt to identify what characteristics or practices make good leaders (Lazear, 2010). These studies 
carefully document the existence of leadership effects on collective outcomes. This paper complements their 
findings by focusing on one particular form of leadership, i.e. leading-by-example, and by measuring its 
effect  directly  on followers’ choices,  rather  than  on  variables  derived  from  their  aggregation  –  such  as 
growth and type of public goods provided.  
Perhaps  the  greatest  attention  to  leadership  in  economics  has  been  in  the  area  of  experimental 
economics,  where  a  rapidly  growing  number  of  papers  use  simple  laboratory  experiments  to  study  the 
effectiveness  of  leadership  in  the  context  of  voluntary  public  good  games.  Some  of  these  experiments 
consider situations in which a leader has private information regarding the benefit obtained by provision of a 
public good (Potters, 2007), as in theoretical models by Hermalin (1998) and Vesterlund (2003). In the 
experiments, informed first-movers are able to influence the behavior of subsequent contributors. Other 
experiments consider situations in which there is no informational asymmetry, to study whether the presence 
of a first-acting leader can influence followers’ contributions and increase public good provision. In general,   5 
these studies find that high contributions by leaders induce higher contributions by followers (Moxnes & 
Van der Hejden, 2003; Gächter & Renner, 2003) and nicely demonstrate the role of leaders in overcoming 
free-riding and coordination issues in social dilemmas. Most laboratory experiments induce status randomly, 
using small tasks or manipulating information within the laboratory. This paper takes a  complementary 
approach, in that it wishes to explore the effect of already existing leadership on the behavior of leaders and 
followers. Moreover, by making salient the different degrees of authority with which subjects are endowed 
outside the experiment, the present study can focus on longer-term determinants of leadership. 
Field experiments on leadership are rare, as they face the key methodological issue of endogeneity 
between  selection  into  leadership  and  leader’s  performance.  Studies  that  combine  laboratory  and  field 
evidence find that local leaders’ behavior is correlated with community members’ contributions to public 
goods (Beekman et al., 2011; Kosfeld & Rustagi, 2011). Non-experimental studies of community-driven 
development underline the role of local leaders and elites in shaping the outcomes of development projects 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Field studies and experiments on common pool resources show that communication, 
monitoring and sanctioning are effective in enforcing sustainable management systems among user groups 
(Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008), especially when management institutions and their leaders are chosen by 
users  themselves  (Ostrom,  2002).  The  present  study  contributes  to  these  strands  of  the  literature  by 
examining what dimensions of authority are associated with leaders’ effectiveness.  
While not explicitly about leadership, two further strands of the literature are close in spirit to this 
study.  Theoretical  and  empirical  research  on  social  networks  investigates  influence  within  groups  as  a 
function of  the position, number and type of links that individuals have within the network (Jackson, 2008; 
Padgett and Ansel, 1993). While the empirical analysis in this paper will always control for the number of 
social links of each participant, the focus of the present study is that of investigating the consequences of 
individual status, rather than its sources. Research on charitable giving shares this focus, and features a 
handful of field experiments in which donations are found to increase following the observation of others’ 
contributions, especially if lead donators are high status individuals (e.g., Shang & Croson, 2009; Frey & 
Meyer, 2004; Alpizar & Martinsson, 2010). This paper observes how leaders and followers’ tendency to 
conform to each other’s choices evolves over time, and, by doing so, tests the findings of the charitable 
giving literature within a dynamic decision environment. 
     
3. Setting and design 
3.1. Setting 
A  total  of  251 individuals  from  8  villages took  part  in the study.  The  villages  are  located in  different 
municipalities of the province of Monteria, in the Northern Coast of Colombia. They are similar in terms of 
economic and environmental characteristics. Farming and fishing are the main economic activities. Rice, 
maize, yam, beans and plantain are grown across the region. Flooding and droughts are both frequent causes 
of harvest loss. Health posts and primary schools are present in 4 and 6 of the villages respectively. Access to 
other types of infrastructure differs across the sample. In particular, the largest village is reached by paved   6 
road and piped water, while the others are not. Regardless of the type of infrastructure, participants from all 
the communities mention contamination of drinking water as a major issue. 
A local farmers’ cooperative, ASPROCIG, acted as entry point to the communities. Representatives 
of ASPROCIG delivered invitations to their fellow community members. Since no show-up fee was paid to 
encourage attendance,
1 the invitation process followed a se ries of guidelines in order to reduce selection 
biases. Participants had to live in the village, be at least 18 years old and responsible for financial decisions 
within the household. We invited preferably the household head or the spouse and tried to limit participation 
to 1 person per family. An average of 20 individuals, from a minimum of 18 to a ma ximum of 27, 
participated to 12 experimental sessions.
2  
 
3.2.  Design 
Each  session  involved  a  ranking  exercise,  the  mapping  of  the  social  network,  a  decision  stage  and  an 
individual survey. An experimenter conducted the session, read out the instructions and answered questions 
from participants. Two assistants helped with the logistics and made sure that participants followed the 
experimental instructions. Sessions took on average three and a half hours. 
 
3.2.1. Ranking participants’ social status  
The ranking exercise was aimed at isolating three dimensions of authority within the village: formal, moral 
and traditional. Formal authority concerns the dimension of social status associated with formal leadership 
roles and political power. Moral authority is related to respect and trust in one’s ethical judgment. Finally, 
traditional authority refers to the qualities that anthropologists associate with leadership among indigenous 
societies in Latin America, e.g. the ability to speak in public and tell stories (Clastres, 1974). Isolating these 
types  of  authority  allows  me  to  assess  which  one  is  more  relevant  for  decisions  over  local  common 
resources, and thus to investigate the nature of such decisions in the study setting.  
In  order  to  isolate  the  different  dimensions  of  authority,  participants  were  presented  with  three 
hypothetical situations. The starting point for the formal authority ranking was the following: “The mayor 
has accepted to meet representatives from the village to discuss the most serious problems it faces (e.g. roads 
and  drinking  water).  Who  among  you  should  go  to  talk  to  the  mayor?”.  The  moral  authority  ranking 
presented  participants  with  the  following  choice  instead:  “There  is  a  village  member  who  is  harming 
everybody with his behavior (e.g. contaminating the water with waste and chemicals). Who among you 
should go to talk to him about the harm he’s doing to the community?”. Finally, the traditional authority 
ranking was based around a third situation: “There is a municipal fair in which people from all villages are 
invited to tell stories, jokes and sing. Who among you should represent the community at the municipal 
fair?”. 
                                                           
1 ASPROCIG requested that no show-up fee should be paid. They were afraid that being paid to participate to a 
community meeting, which involved a decision about a common project, may lead people to always expect a private 
return from engaging in public initiatives. 
2 2 experimental sessions were run in each of the 4 largest villages in the sample. When in the same village, sessions 
took place over two subsequent days.   7 
Participants selected their representatives collectively for all rankings. The experimenter invited each 
participant to suggest someone else as representative. For each candidate, the experimenter asked remaining 
participants if  they approved the candidature or not. If no objections were raised, a candidate would stand in 
front of the group, otherwise the experimenter prompted further suggestions. The experimenter solicited 
nominations in the most random and inclusive manner possible. As soon as the number of candidates reached 
one-third  of  participants,  the  experimenter  interrupted  the  process.  She  asked  one  more  time  whether 
everyone  agreed  with the  selection  or  whether  more  deserving  candidates  had  been  left  out,  and  made 
changes according to participants’ answers. This group represented the first choice as village representatives. 
Then the experimenter told participants that this first group would not be able to go to the meeting, and asked 
them to select a second group as substitutes. The process was repeated in a similar fashion for the group of 
substitutes. The experiment assistant recorded the  order in which candidates joined the first and second 
group. The remaining one-third of participants went to form a third group. 
The ranking process was conducted three times, once for each hypothetical situation. Their order was 
randomized across sessions.
3 At the end of the exercise, the experimenter led a group discussion on the 
qualities of top-ranked individuals, for each ranking type, and recorded the answers. Finally, one between the 
formal and the moral authority ranking was randomly drawn to be implemented .
4 Participants were then 
divided into groups according to it, seated in three different rows and given colored cards to mark their group 
assignment. First choices – members of the top group - received Orange cards; the substitutes – members of 
the middle group - received Blue cards; and the rest - bottom-ranked individuals - received Brown cards. 
Before proceeding to the decision stage, the experimenter reminded everyone of the ranking used to divide 
them into groups by referring to the corresponding hypothetical situation. 
The ranking exercise was aimed at reproducing as closely as possible collective decision-making 
processes  that  take  place  during  community  meetings.  This  procedure  is  similar  to  those  commonly 
implemented in participatory wealth rankings (Chambers, 1994). Extensive focus groups, conducted in the 
study area, guided the definition of the hypothetical situations used to identify each type of leaders. While 
the ranking process’ lack of formal decision rules generates a loss of experimental control and makes the 
outcomes of the selection susceptible to being captured by vocal group members, research on deliberation 
processes  in  group  decisions  shows  that  inclusive  information  acquisition  during  deliberations  yields 
accurate  and  informative  decisions,  and  that  deliberation  processes  are,  under  certain  conditions,  more 
critical for the achievement of such outcomes than decision rules (Lizzeri & Yariv, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the ranking procedure is likely to have induced a series of biases in the resulting 
classifications. By imposing the division of participants to a session in three equally sized groups for each 
hypothetical situation, the ranking created discontinuity in individual status. Individuals above and below the 
threshold were probably similar, but belonged to different status groups. Moreover, the fact that members of 
                                                           
3 The randomization was between the formal and the moral ranking, while the traditional ranking was always conducted 
second. This choice was motivated by the desire to separate the moral and formal rankings, one of which would be 
implemented in the following stage of the experiment.  
4 Issues of statistical power forced me to leave out the traditional authority ranking from the draw and focus on the 
dimensions of authority which I expected to be more salient in the study area.   8 
the top and middle group had to be nominated by other session participants increases the likelihood that more 
vocal individuals took control of the process and suggested their friends as representatives. The empirical 
analysis will present evidence on the presence of these biases and their effect on leaders and followers’ 
choices. 
 
3.2.2. Network mapping 
After the ranking exercise, the experiment assistants conducted a mapping of the social network. Subjects 
were interviewed individually about their relationship with each of the other session participants. For each 
possible pair (i, j) of participants to a session, therefore , we know whether individual i was a relative, friend, 
acquaintance or stranger to individual j. The social network data will be used in the empirical analysis to 
explore the correlation existing between individuals’ status and the number and status of their social links. 
  
3.2.3. Contribution decision 
Participants to the experiment were asked to take the following basic decision: “Out of an endowment of 
20,000 Pesos, how much to you wish to donate to a biodiversity conservation project?” Participants would 
keep the difference between contribution and endowment. 20,000 Pesos is equal to 10 USD, about one and a 
half times the daily farm laborer’s wage. This basic decision was taken a total of 13 times by each participant 
under different conditions, as explained below. To ensure that all 13 decisions of the session were taken 
seriously, the experimenter made clear to participants that each of them had the same chance of being paid. 
A random draw at the end of the session decided which choice was implemented. 
Participants’  contributions  financed  the  establishment  of  a  tree  nursery  in  a  primary  school.  A 
random draw at the end of the study determined which of the schools serving the sample villages received 
the funds. Tree nurseries help biodiversity conservation in different ways. First, native trees grown there are 
used to reforest endangered ecosystems, such as canal banks, where they prevent soil erosion. Second, these 
ecosystems used to be habitats for endangered animal species, which left following deforestation. Restoring 
them would bring back native fauna in the area. Third, schools use tree nursery to teach environmental 
education to kids. Children learn about native species and how they can help preserve the soil and limit the 
use of chemicals. Finally, everyone in the community can plant trees from the nursery on their own land. 
As mentioned above, the decision stage involved a total of 13 choices, divided across a private 
decision and 4 decision rounds. Participants first took the basic decision in private. The 4 decision rounds 
consisted of 3 choices each. Each choice was still taken individually, but participants were assigned a partner 
and  received  information about the  partner’s ranking,  i.e.  the  color  of  the  group  she  belonged  to.
  This 
information was given through a colored square - orange, blue or brown – drawn on participants’ decision 
sheets. Pairs changed each round, and nobody had the same partner twice. Table 1 summarizes the structure 
of the decision stage. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here]   9 
 
The experimental design varied exogenously pair composition on the basis of participants’ ranking. In round 
1, one possible group combination was randomly drawn to be implemented. In round 2, couples changed by 
drawing a second combination. In round 3 pairs were formed according to the combination still left to 
implement. Finally, in round 4 the color combination of round 1 was repeated with different partners. The 
pair formation process can be illustrated through an example, which is reproduced in Figure 1. In round 1 
each member of the Orange group was paired with one member of the Blue group, while members of the 
Brown group were paired among themselves; in round 2 members of the Orange group were paired with 
members of the Brown group, while participants in the Blue group were paired among themselves; in round 
3, members of the Blue and Brown groups were paired to each other, and members of the Orange group were 
matched among themselves; finally, in round 4, the round 1 combination was repeated. The random draws in 
round 1 and 2 determined the sequence of group combinations implemented.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The  design  introduced  a  second  variation.  Within  each  round,  decisions  differed  in  terms  of  their 
observability  and  of  the  information  available  on  partner’s  preferences  at  the  time  of  choosing,  as 
summarized in Table 2. When taking the first decision of the round, participants knew only their partner’s 
ranking, which appeared as a colored square on their decision sheets. They also knew that their choice would 
be shown to their partner and that, in turn, they would observe their partner’s contribution. Before taking the 
second  decision,  each  participant  was  shown  her  partner’s  contribution  in  the  first  decision.  Then  the 
experimenter asked everyone to write again their contribution choice on the decision sheet, reminding them 
that they were free to choose any contribution amount and that the second decision would also be observed 
by  their  partners.  Finally,  before  taking  the  third  decision,  each  participant  was  shown  her  partner’s 
contribution in the second decision and asked to make her choice a third time. The third decision differed in 
that participants knew that it would not be observed by their partner. Throughout the round, the experimenter 
reminded participants that they were free to contribute whatever they wished, regardless of their previous 
choices. This process was repeated from the first to the fourth round, for a total of 12 decisions. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Hypotheses 
This section discusses the main hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical analysis, and cites existing 
theoretical and empirical research in support of each hypothesis. The first question that this study aims to 
address is how the presence of a leader affects average contribution by a group. Total contribution by a pair 
may be higher, when at least one leader is part of it, because leaders contribute on average more, because 
lower-ranked participants make on average higher donations when paired with a leader, or because of a   10 
combination of these two effects. We, therefore, have to make predictions concerning  both leaders and 
lower-ranked  participants’  behavior.  We  expect that  leaders  will  contribute  higher  amounts to the  local 
public  good.  This  prediction  is  based  on  the  fact  that  both  the  formal  and  the  moral  rankings  define 
leadership  in  relation  to  individual  concerns  for  the  common  good,  thus  leading  to  the  selection  of 
individuals  who  are  likely  to  have  higher  valuations  of  projects  benefiting  the  community.  Moreover, 
empirical  evidence  from  laboratory  studies  on  leadership,  which  find  a  positive  relationship  between 
individuals’ relative status and contributions to a common project (Kumru & Vesterlund, 2010), suggests 
that individuals will contribute more when paired with lower-ranked partners than otherwise, and vice versa. 
This evidence is interpreted as indication that higher-ranked individuals are aware of their responsibility and 
influence as role models. Overall, these two mechanisms are expected to have a positive effect on leaders’ 
contributions, and through them on total contribution levels by a pair when leaders are among its members. 
However, such positive effect of leadership may be attenuated by the negative effect of relative status on 
giving by leaders’ partners. The question of which effect will prevail is ultimately an empirical one, that will 
be addressed in the next section. Predictions on contributions by participants when matched with leaders can 
also be made on the basis of signaling theories of altruism (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998). These 
models claim that individuals are more altruistic when observed by others, the more so the more they wish to 
acquire approval from the observers.  Based on this perspective, we expect lower-ranked participants to 
donate more when paired with leaders. Existing empirical evidence lead us to anticipate that the positive 
effects of leadership will dominate the negative ones, thus leading to an overall increase in pair composition 
thanks to the presence of a leader. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Pair contribution is higher when leaders are members of a pair.  
 
A second question relating to aggregate contributions to the public good, addressed by this study, concerns 
which dimension of authority is associated with greater effectiveness of leaders. Theoretical and empirical 
studies of motivation crowding, and psychological studies of social comparison support the hypothesis that 
giving will be increased on average by making moral leadership salient. The notion of motivation crowding 
refers to those settings in which individual behavior is driven by social norms or preferences, or feelings of 
moral duty. In such contexts, the introduction of external regulations or incentives can change people's 
perception of the behavior. Voluntary goodwill is turned into a market-like interaction, resulting in fewer 
people willing to act altruistically (Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Götte, 1999). In the field of natural resource 
management,  research  on  motivation  crowding  finds  that  the  exogenous  introduction  of  regulations, 
monetary sanctions and authorities weakens individuals’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to local public 
goods (Ostrom, 2006; Vatn, 2006). Since contributing to support local biodiversity is not required by any 
formal law in the study setting, this type of decision has a predominantly moral dimension. According to the 
motivation crowding literature, therefore, we expect that participants will on average contribute more under 
the moral than under the formal ranking. Studies on leadership in social psychology support this claim, by   11 
showing  that  the  relevance  of  leaders’  qualities  to  the  decision  under  consideration  increases  leaders’ 
legitimacy. We thus predict that moral leaders will be more salient and legitimate sources of authority than 
formal  leaders  in  the  context  of  the  experiment,  and  prompt  higher  contributions  by  lower-ranked 
participants. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Moral authority is more effective, i.e. individuals contribute more when moral authority is 
salient within the experiment. 
 
Finally, this study asks how the presence of a leader within a group influences the evolution of contributions 
to the public good. An established result in the experimental literature on public good games is that, in the 
absence of communication or institutions, cooperation tends to unravel over time (Isaac, et al., 1985). This is 
due to the fact that most individuals are ‘conditional cooperators’, i.e. they contribute to the public good as 
long as others do, but withdraw their cooperation as soon as they observe others defecting (Croson, 1999; 
Fischbacher,  et  al.,  2001).  The  evidence  on  complementarities  across  agents  in  charitable  donations, 
mentioned in Section 2, supports the claim that individuals tend to conform to others’ actions. A number of 
mechanisms discussed in the literature on social preferences and learning can account for this empirical 
regularity. Theories of fairness and inequity aversion predict that individuals conform to others’ choices in 
order to  minimize  payoff inequality  (Fehr  &  Schmidt,  1999;  Bolton  &  Ockenfels,  2000).  According  to 
fairness  models,  positive  or  negative  examples  by  others  trigger  contribution  change  by  conditionally 
cooperative individuals (Rabin, 1993; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Levine, 1998). Theories of conformism and 
social norms argue that individuals conform to others’ actions because deviating from standards of behavior 
generates disutility in terms of loss of status or painful emotions (Clark & Oswald, 1998; Lopez-Perez, 
2008). Conformism is also endogenously generated by models of social preferences that introduce envy or 
disutility from deviating from group average behavior in individuals’ utility functions (Bernheim, 1994; 
Maccheroni, et al., 2010). If social status or prestige can be gained through contributions to a public good, 
for instance because giving is perceived as a signal of wealth or altruism, signaling models also predict that 
agents  adjust  their  choices  to  guarantee  themselves  status  at  the  minimum  cost,  given  others’  actions 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008; Harbaugh, 1998). Beside 
social preference theories, models of social learning claim that others’ actions influence individual behavior 
because  they  convey  information  on  the  value  of  the  public  good  (Conlisk,  1980;  Banerjee,  1992; 
Bikhchandani, et al., 1992). Although the goal of this paper is not that of testing alternative theories, in 
Section 7 I will argue that some of these theoretical perspectives appear better suited than others to interpret 
the empirical findings. Here it suffices to say that all these models, together with the empirical evidence on 
conditional cooperation, lead us to expect to observe a general tendency by individuals to conform to each 
other’s choices. 
The likelihood that participants revise their contribution level upon observing others’ decisions will 
depend on their absolute and relative ranking. We base this prediction on psychological theories of upward   12 
social comparison.  These studies claim that, in  determining the appropriateness of their own behavior, 
individuals compare themselves to others who are believed to possess more knowledge, or fare better, along 
dimensions relevant to the decision under consideration (Suls, et al., 2002). The tendency to conform to 
experts and leaders is found to be increasing in their commitment to group goals (Price & Garland, 1981), 
attractiveness  and  relevance  within  the  decision  setting  (Festinger,  1954).  Based  on  this  literature,  we 
anticipate that individuals’ tendency to conform to others’ choices will be decreasing in their absolute and 
relative status. This prediction is also supported by laboratory experiments in economics, showing that first-
moving leaders who have higher status or  are more cooperative themselves induce higher contributions 
among followers, and that high status followers are less likely to conform to low status first-movers (Kumru 
& Vesterlund, 2010; Gächter, et al., 2011). These arguments are behind the third hypothesis that will be 
tested in the next section. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Pair contribution is more stable over time when leaders are members of a pair. 
 
5. Empirical strategy and results 
The  empirical  analysis  in  this  section  follows  a  series  of  steps.  First,  a  descriptive  investigation  of 
participants’ characteristics and of individual traits correlated with altruism and status is conducted (Section 
5.1). Then the main findings are presented (Section 5.2): giving is higher when leaders are part of pair, 
primarily because leaders give more; this effect is stronger when moral authority is made salient within the 
experiment; and giving decreases less over time when leaders are part of a pair, because leaders only weakly 
adjust contribution downwards after observing other give less.  
 
5.1. Demographic and socioeconomic correlates of status and giving 
Table 3 shows participants’ average characteristics. Their age and education attainments are in line with 
country averages. Almost 40% of them are women. Participants’ average age and gender are consistent with 
the goal of the sampling process of recruiting the head or spouse within each household. The fact that only 
10% of participants had no formal education minimizes concerns that they might not be able to understand 
the experiment. The majority of participants are smallholder farmers, while only 10% of them own livestock. 
Almost 80% of them reports having suffered income losses due to environmental shocks over the previous 
year, mostly flooding, droughts and water contamination. The large share of people who depend on farming 
for their livelihood and who were negatively hit by environmental shocks suggests that participants were 
likely to value the biodiversity conservation project, as reforestation of canal banks with native species 
greatly reduces the incidence of floods. This claim is supported by further survey evidence, showing that 
94% of participants believe that the tree nursery project will be useful to their family. Mean farm size is 
above 2 hectares, and average earnings over the previous week are equal to 35,146 Pesos (17.5 USD). The 
experiment, therefore, endowed participants with a significant amount of money. Data on the number of 
associations in which each participant held leadership roles, such as president, secretary, treasures, was also   13 
collected: this figure ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 3 associations with a mean of .33. Each 
person has an average of 3.65 friends or relatives also attending the session. The share of participants who 
are  ASPROCIG  members  (57%)  is  above  that  of  ASPROCIG  members  in  the  study  region,  a  likely 
consequence of the association’s role in the recruitment process. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Participants ranked themselves according to three different criteria, as described in Section 3.2.1. The goal of 
the formal, moral and traditional authority rankings was to isolate corresponding dimensions of authority. 
During the discussion, conducted at the end of the exercise, participants listed the main qualities of top-
ranked individuals for each ranking. A qualitative assessment of the results from the discussion shows that 
the three rankings indeed captured different leadership profiles: individuals at the top of the formal authority 
ranking are active in the life of the community, contribute to solving its problems and have good links with 
municipal authorities; those at the top of the moral authority one are good speakers, diplomatic, morally 
sound, honest and in good relationships with fellow community members; finally, top-ranked individuals in 
the traditional authority classification are joyful, funny, talented, charismatic and full of enthusiasm.
 5  
The three rankings are correlated but not collinear. 50% of top-ranked individuals in the formal 
ranking are also in the top group in the moral ranking. As shown in Table 4, pairwise correlation between the 
formal and moral ranking is 34.9%, between the formal and traditional ranking is 13%, and between the 
moral and traditional ranking is -14.2%. All correlations are significant at the 10% level. This preliminary 
overview is reassuring of the ability of the three rankings to distinguish between different leadership profiles. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Individual characteristics correlated with the different rankings are explored next. Table 5 shows results from 
the following ordered logit regression: 
 
    (           )                                           (1) 
 
where             is 3 if i is in the top group, 2 if she’s in the middle group and 1 if she’s in the bottom 
group,       are session fixed-effects, and     is a vector of individual characteristics: age, gender, marital 
status, household dependency ratio, a dummy equal to 1 if no kids under 12 live in i’s household, education, 
per capita household income over the previous week, number of community associations in which i holds 
leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, and a dummy 
equal to 1 if i is an ASPROCIG member. The regression is run for the formal, moral and traditional rankings 
in Columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Column 4 presents results using average rank as dependent variable.  
                                                           
5 Table A1 reports, for each ranking, the top five qualities of top group members mentioned.   14 
Age and education are positively correlated with status in the formal and moral rankings. Holding 
leadership roles in associations increases the probability of being highly ranked in terms of formal authority. 
The coefficient on being a woman is negative throughout, and significant for moral and average ranking. 
Having friends or relatives among session participants increases the likelihood of occupying a high position 
in the formal and moral ranking. Status in traditional ranking shows a positive and significant correlation 
only with the number of leadership roles one holds, probably due to the fact that public officers are often 
required to speak to community members. Overall, regression results are consistent with the purpose of the 
different rankings. Being educated and occupying positions in community organizations is more relevant for 
formal  authority,  while  age  matters  more  for  moral  authority.  The  fact  that  almost  no  proxy  of 
socioeconomic status is significantly correlated with traditional authority is hardly surprising. The qualitative 
assessment conducted above shows that traditional authority is associated with being funny and enthusiast, 
qualities  for  which  observable  proxies  are  hard  to  find.  Age,  gender,  education,  roles  in  community 
associations and ASPROCIG membership are significant correlates of average ranking. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Now I explore which characteristics are correlated with giving in the experiment. Table 6 shows results from 
the following regression: 
 
                                                  (2) 
 
where     is the same vector of individual variables used above. The dependent variable     is contribution in 
the private decision in Column 1 and average contribution over rounds 1 to 4 in Column 2. Results are 
presented from OLS models for consistency with the specification adopted in the remaining of the section 
(see footnote 6 below).   
ASPROCIG members contribute significantly more throughout the session. This result is consistent 
with  ASPROCIG’s  mission  of  pursuing  income  growth  through  the  protection  and  enhancement  of 
traditional crops and farming techniques. ASPROCIG considers biodiversity conservation as a necessary 
condition  for  development,  not  as  a  constraint,  and  was  therefore  in  favor  of  the  establishment  of tree 
nurseries in the area. The ratio between the number of kids and the number of adults living in a household 
affects contribution negatively, probably through its impact on household needs. However, having no kids is 
negatively correlated with giving, both in private and on average, though only the correlation with private 
donations is significant. This result may reflect the nature of the biodiversity project, which directly benefits 
kids.  Having  children  may  also  increase  people’s  concern  for  the  future  in  general,  and  environmental 
sustainability in particular (Dupont, 2004).  
 
[Insert Table 6 here]   15 
 
Note that the coefficients on household income are positive but insignificant throughout, probably because of 
the homogeneity in income levels among participants. The lack of significance of income may be also due to 
noisiness of the proxy used, i.e. income over the week prior to the experiment. A first evidence against this 
statement comes from the observation that the household income variable is positively and significantly 
correlated with respondents’ assessments of their own subjective economic status. Moreover, replacing the 
income variable with asset measures, such as size of land owned, does not change the results. Here and in the 
rest of the analysis, regressions control for household income per capita and not for farm size, because the 
use of the latter variable, while not affecting the results, leads to dropping observations for those participants 
who did not own land or could not estimate precisely the size of their plots. 
 
5.2. Main results 
This subsection presents the main results from the experiment. It first analyzes aggregate giving and finds 
that it is a function of status and type of authority made salient within the experiment. It then explores the 
evolution of giving over time, again showing that contribution revisions differ between leaders and lower-
ranked participants. These findings are consistent with the predictions derived from the literature in Section 
4. 
 
RESULT 1. Pair contribution is higher when leaders are members of a pair. This is due to differences in 
average contribution levels depending on individual absolute and relative status. 
Total contribution by a pair is equal on average to 14, 328 Pesos when at least one member of the 
pair is a leader, and to 12,713 Pesos otherwise. The presence of a leader in a pair, therefore, increases total 
pair contribution by 13% relative to the total amount contributed by pairs where both members are lower-
ranked.  This  difference  is  statistically  significant,  as  shown  in  Table  7,  which  present  results  from  the 
following regression: 
 
                                                          (3) 
 
where      denotes pair p’s total contribution at time t in session s (i.e. the sum of i and j’s contribution, 
where i and j are the members of pair p), and                is equal to 1 if pair p features at least one 
leader at time t. The regression includes session fixed-effects and uses a linear random-effects model (Table 
7). 
6 
                                                           
6 In the analysis, I assume the following structure for the error term     :                      , where         
depending on whether the outcome variable is at the individual or pair level respectively. The first term models the 
correlation existing between different choices by the same individual (pair). The second term captures the correlation 
between choices of different individuals (pairs) participating to the same session, generated by observable and 
unobservable factors varying across sessions. The third term reflects idiosyncratic variations in the error term. In order 
to control for these different sources of heteroskedasticity, in what follows I will adopt two main empirical models. 
When the regressors of interest are invariant at the individual level (pair), for instance absolute ranking and type of   16 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The sum of pair members’ contributions is significantly higher when at least one of them is a leader. This 
difference  is  due  to  the  fact  that  leaders  contribute  on  average  significantly  more  than  lower-ranked 
participants. Table 8 confirms this claim, showing results from the following regression: 
 
                                                           (4) 
 
where      denotes the contribution of individual i, taking part in session s, at time t, and          is equal to 
1 if i is in the top group. The regression in Column 1 features i’s leadership status as the only regressor, 
while the one in Column 2 adds the following individual controls    : age, gender, education, number of 
community associations in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that 
i is a friend or relative, and ASPROCIG membership. Comparing the results in Columns 1 and 2, we observe 
that the difference in leaders’ contribution is mainly due to different observable characteristics of leaders and 
lower-ranked participants: in fact, the inclusion of individual controls reduces the size of the coefficient on 
leadership by about 30% and affects its significance level. This finding confirms once again the claim that 
individuals’ positions in the ranking reflect important characteristics within the decision environment under 
consideration, and  suggests  that  differences  in contribution levels cannot  be simply  induced  by  placing 
individuals in leadership positions, regardless of their qualities. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Unobservable characteristics of leaders may also contribute to determine their higher contributions relative to  
non-leaders.  In  particular,  leaders  may  have  a  higher  valuation  of  environmental  conservation.  The 
qualitative data derived from participants’ discussion of leaders’ characteristics support the idea that top-
ranked individuals, being more committed than others to solving community problems, may also be more 
willing to promote the conservation of common natural resources. Moreover, survey data show that leaders 
are significantly more likely than non-leaders to have engaged in conservation activities over the year prior 
to the experiment, and that 92% of participants believe leaders to be the most knowledgeable people in the 
community about environmental issues.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
ranking made salient within a session, I will adopt a random-effects model, control for observable and unobservable 
factors at the session level using session fixed-effect, and cluster the standard errors at the individual level. When the 
regressions control for time-varying characteristics at the individual level, for instance relative ranking and partner’s 
status, then they will include individual fixed-effects and feature robust standard errors. In order to exploit the 
advantages in terms of efficiency and control allowed by these model specifications, in the remaining of the session I 
show results exclusively from linear regressions. The results are robust to the use of alternative specifications, in 
particular Tobit (contributions are censored at 0 and 20,000 Pesos) and Probit (revision probabilities) models with 
session fixed-effects and observations clustered at the individual level. The regressions do not include round fixed-
effects, unless explicitly stated, because they are never significant.   17 
While  absolute  status  per  se  is  not  associated  with  significantly  higher  contributions,  previous 
evidence on leadership suggest that there may be a positive correlation between relative ranking and giving. 
Laboratory  studies  on  social  status  show  that  individuals  contribute  more  to  public  goods  when  their 
followers are of lower standing than when they are matched with same-status partners (Kumru & Vesterlund, 
2010). This finding is interpreted as a proof that higher-ranked individuals are aware of being role models for 
lower-ranked peers, more so than for same-status ones. In order to test this claim in the setting of the present 
study, I examine participants’ contribution depending on their status relative to that of their partner. Results 
from the following regression offer clean evidence on the positive relationship between relative status and 
giving: 
 
                                                         (5) 
 
where               is equal to 1 if i is paired with a lower-ranked partner at time t in session s.  The 
regression  includes individual fixed-effects (    ).  Table  9  presents  regression  results. The  positive  and 
significant coefficients on the higher relative status dummy indicates that the same individual contributes 
significantly more when she is the higher-ranked member of a pair than otherwise.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In order to test whether the effect of relative status is stronger for leaders, I interact the relative ranking 
dummy with variables equal to 1 if individual i is in the top or middle group respectively: 
 
                                                                                
                                                              (6) 
 
Individual controls replace individual fixed-effects in this regression, as we wish to investigate the effect of 
(time invariant) absolute status. Regression results, reported in Table 10, show that both leaders and middle-
ranked participants give more than bottom group members (omitted category). In addition, they confirm that 
higher relative ranking is associated with higher donations. The sum of the coefficients on the leader and 
higher-rank dummies, and on their interaction term, is significantly different from 0 (p=.060), while the 
corresponding sum of coefficients for middle-ranked participants is not (p=.274). However, the former sum 
of coefficients is not significantly different from the latter (p=.296), suggesting that the effect of relative 
status on giving is not significantly stronger among leaders than among middle-ranked participants.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
   18 
The findings presented in Tables 9 and 10 support previous laboratory evidence on individuals’ awareness of 
being role models for their lower-ranked peers, which we find to be equally strong among leaders and 
middle-ranked participants. This mechanism combines with leaders’ higher valuation of the conservation 
project in determining the difference in contribution levels between leaders and other participants.  
On the contrary, contributions by lower-ranked individuals do not significantly vary depending on 
whether they are paired with a leader or not. Table 11 reports results from the following regression, which 
support this claim: 
 
                                                                               
                                         (7) 
 
            is equal to 1 if i is in the middle or bottom group, and                  is equal to 1 if i’s 
partner at time t is a leader. Individual controls     are included in the regression only in Column 2. The 
negative coefficients on the two main effects confirm findings from previous regressions, i.e. that giving is 
decreasing in absolute and relative status. Participants give more when paired with a leader, but this effect is 
not significant. The desire to impress leaders by donating high amounts does not appear to significantly 
motivate lower-ranked participants contribution choices. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
To summarize, the first main finding reported in this section is that the presence of a leader in a pair 
increases total pair contribution. This effect is driven by the fact that leaders give more than non-leaders, 
especially if their partners are lower-ranked. Two mechanisms combine to produce this result: first, leaders 
value environmental conservation more than non-leaders; second, there is a general tendency of individuals 
to  increase  giving  when  paired  with  lower-ranked  partners.  On  the  contrary,  non-leaders  do  not  make 
significantly  higher  contributions  when paired  with  a  leader. These  results  are  consistent  with  previous 
findings from the experimental literature on leadership and with predictions of social comparison models, 
while they do not suggest the presence of signaling motives behind participants’ choices. 
 
 RESULT 2. Moral authority is more effective, i.e. mean contribution is higher when the moral ranking is 
salient. In particular, leaders and bottom group members contribute significantly more when moral authority 
is salient. 
Next, I examine whether aggregate contribution differs depending on the type of authority made 
salient within a session. Recall that participants ranked themselves across three different dimensions of 
authority – formal, moral and traditional – and that one between the formal and the moral ranking was drawn 
in each session to be implemented. Therefore, each ranking was made salient in half of the sessions and it is 
possible to compare contribution levels across sessions, depending on which ranking was implemented.   19 
Average pair contribution is higher when moral ranking is salient. The results from the following 
regression demonstrate this claim: 
 
                                                        (8) 
 
            is equal to 1 if moral authority was made salient for pair p in session s. Regression results are 
presented in Table 12, where the dependent variable is total pair contribution at time t  and the regression 
model is GLS estimation of random-effects model with standard errors clustered at the individual level. Total 
giving by a pair is on average 2,400 Pesos higher when the implemented group classification is based on the 
moral authority ranking. 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
This increase masks differences in behavior across status groups depending on ranking applied. Figure 2 
shows average contribution by group, when the moral ranking is salient (dark grey columns) and when the 
formal ranking is salient (light grey columns). Both leaders and bottom group members give significantly 
more under the moral than the formal ranking (p-values of the two-sided t-tests are p=.004 and p=.002 
respectively). Middle group members, on the contrary, contribute more on average when the formal ranking 
is salient (p=.073).  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Insights from theories of motivation crowding and social comparison theories  shed some light on these 
contribution patterns. The arguments that follow are based on the observation that in the study setting the 
decision to conserve local biodiversity is a voluntary expression of civic engagement and valuation of the 
environment. Indeed, no formal laws exist to sanction or reward natural resource use, and decisions to 
preserve the environment fall in the realm of ethical rather than legal norms. As discussed in Section 4, the 
literature on motivation crowding supports the prediction that individual motivation to contribute will be 
crowded-in by making the moral dimension of the decision salient, and crowded-out by stressing the role of 
formal authorities. This prediction applies to all status groups. In addition, theories of social comparison 
offer a second reason for lower-ranked individuals to contribute more under the moral than the formal 
authority:  if  moral  leadership  is  based  on  attributes  perceived  to  be  more  salient  to the decision  under 
consideration  than  formal  leadership,  then  lower-ranked  individuals  will  be  more  inclined  to  match 
contributions by moral than by formal leaders. Indeed, a significantly higher share of participants believe 
leaders to be experts of environmental issues when moral leadership is salient (95%) than  when formal 
leadership is salient (89%), and this difference is statistically significant (p=.081). The combination of these   20 
two explanations can account for the behavior of leaders and bottom group members, but is inconsistent with 
that of middle group members. 
A tentative explanation for the fact that middle-ranked individuals contribute on average less under 
the moral than the formal ranking relies on insights from psychological theories of counterfactual thinking. 
These theories argue that social comparison processes depend not only on the existing social ranking, but 
also on  the most salient counterfactual for the individual in a specific situation (Medvec et al., 1995). 
According to this literature, people’s emotional responses to events are influenced by their thoughts about 
‘what might have been’. Through an analysis of emotional responses of bronze and silver medalists at the 
Olympics, Medvec et al. (1995) find that bronze medalists tend to be happier than silver medalists. They 
attribute this result to the fact that the most salient counterfactual for silver medalists is winning the gold, 
while for bronze medalists is winning no medals. In the context of this study, if the moral dimension is the 
most relevant to participants’ decisions, the loss of status felt by middle group members relative to leaders 
could be stronger under the moral than formal ranking. In other words, middle-ranked participants may 
perceive their own status as ‘lower than leaders’ status’ more strongly under the moral than under the formal 
ranking. If this were the case, the relationship between relative ranking and giving, established above, would 
account for the difference in average contribution by middle-ranked participants depending on the type of 
authority implemented. 
  To summarize, the second main finding of this study is that average giving is higher when moral 
leadership  is  salient.  In  particular,  leaders  and  bottom  group  members  contribute  significantly  higher 
amounts when the moral ranking is made salient. Theories of motivation crowding and social comparison 
account for these results, given the predominantly moral dimension of the experimental decision. 
 
RESULT 3. Pair contribution is more stable over time when leaders are members of a pair. This is due to 
different tendencies to conform to others’ observed choices depending on individual absolute and relative 
status. 
The first two results presented in this section have focused on aggregate levels of contribution. In 
particular, Result 1 showed that contribution levels are on average higher when pairs feature at least one 
leader. Examining the evolution of giving over time, we observe that contribution levels are also more stable 
when leaders are members of a pair. The following regressions explore contribution trends depending on pair 
composition: 
 
                                                                                          (9) 
                                                                        
                                            (10) 
 
where               was defined above and           denotes the order of decision over time. Regression 
(9) examines the evolution of total pair contribution over the entire course of a session, while regression (10),   21 
through the inclusion of round fixed-effects (      ), focuses on contribution trends within each round. 
Regression results are presented in Table 13. 
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
The negative coefficients on the time variable indicates that there is a decreasing trend in contribution over 
time,  which  is  significant  within  rounds.  This  result  confirms  a  robust  finding  in  laboratory  and  field 
experiments on public good contributions: cooperation starts at positive levels, but deteriorates over time. 
The  presence  of  leaders  in  a  pair  offsets  such  downward  trend:  the  interaction  term                 
          is positive and significant, and the sum of the coefficients on the main effects and interaction 
terms is not significantly different from zero in both regressions (p=.179 and p=.520 respectively).  
  The  general  downward  trend  observed  among  pairs  of  non-leaders  is  due  to  the  tendency  of 
individuals,  on  average,  to  conform  to  partners  decisions.  Recall  that  participants  could  revise  their 
contribution choices after observing those of their partners. We can  therefore observe how participants’ 
revision choices in t depend on the relative size of own and partner’s donation in t-1, by regressing the 
direction of contribution change in t relative to t-1 on the sign of the difference between own and partner’s 
contribution in t-1:  
 
                (               )      (               )                      (11) 
 
where       is the likelihood of upward revisions in t relative to t-1 [         (             )] in Column 1 of 
Table 14, and of downward revisions [         (             )]] in Column 3.  (               ) is equal to 1 
if i gave more than partner j in t-1, whereas  (               ) is equal to 1 if i gave less than j in t-1. Results 
are shown using a linear probability. All regressions include individual fixed-effects. Regression coefficients 
show that participants tend to increase giving after negative lag relative contributions (               ), and 
decrease  it  after  positive  ones  (               ).  This  finding  is  consistent  with  field  evidence  on  the 
complementarity between own and others choices in the realm of charitable giving discussed in Sections 2 
and 4.  
 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 
The tendency to conform does not explain, alone, the general downward trend in giving. For it to produce 
decreasing  levels  of  aggregate  giving,  the  tendency  to  conform  must  be  stronger  when  individuals  are 
exposed to lower than to higher contributions than their own. Indeed, we observe that the sign of lag relative 
contribution influences not only the direction, but also the magnitude of contribution revisions. Figure 3 
shows the relationship between the difference between i and j’s donations in t-1 (               ) on the x-
axis, and the size of contribution revision by i (             ) on the y-axis. The regression line appears   22 
flatter  for  negative  than  for  positive  lag  relative  contributions.  In  fact,  participants  on  average  revise 
donations by 2,662 Pesos after contributing more than their partners, and by 2,183 Pesos after contributing 
more. This difference is statistically significant (p=001), meaning that participants tend to conform more to 
others’  choices  if  conformity  requires  decreases  in  donation.  Indeed,  the  mean  amount  of  contribution 
change is -173 Pesos, significantly different from 0. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The different reactions, that leaders and non-leaders have to others’ contributions, lie behind the more stable 
trend in giving by pairs featuring leaders among their members. In particular, leaders are less likely to 
decrease donations after contributing a lower amount than their partners in t-1. This claim is confirmed by 
the following regressions, examining both i’s likelihood to revise giving, and the amount of revisions by i, as 
a function of i being a leader, of i giving more or less than her partner in t-1 and of their interaction. All 
regressions control for i’s contribution in the private decision,           , for the amount donated by i’s 
partner in t-1,       , and for session fixed-effects: 
 
                                 (               )                 (               ) 
                                                             (12a) 
                                 (               )                 (               ) 
                                                             (12b) 
 
Regressions (12a) focus on upward revisions following negative lag relative contributions, whereas (12b)  on 
downward revisions following positive ones. Table 15 shows regression results for the amount of upward 
revisions in Column 1 [                           ], for the likelihood of upward revision in Column 2 
[               (             )],  for  the  amount  of  downward  revisions  in  Column  3  [             
   (             )], and for the likelihood of downward revision in Column 4 [               (      
      )],]. Leaders are significantly less likely to decrease giving when they see their partners donating lower 
amounts, and when they do, they reduce donations by smaller amounts than non-leaders. Leaders do not 
behave differently from non-leaders when they face partners who donated more than they did in t-1. 
 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
Consistent  with  the  analysis  conducted  on  contribution  levels,  I  now  investigate  whether  the  observed 
differences in leaders’ revision choices are, at least partially, due to a more general effect of relative status on 
the tendency to conform. Results from the following regression are presented in Table 16: 
 
   23 
                                       (               )                      (               ) 
                                                 (13a) 
                                       (               )                      (               ) 
                                                 (13b) 
 
The outcome variables are the same as in the previous table. The regressions focus on the effect of varying 
relative status on individuals’ revision amount (Columns 1 and 3) and likelihood of revision (Columns 2 and 
4), by including individual fixed-effects and controlling for a dummy equal to 1 if individual i in session s is 
the highest-ranked member of a pair at time t,              . Relative status is negatively correlated with 
an individual’s tendency to conform, both upwards and downwards. In fact, being the higher-ranked member 
of a pair is associated with a significantly lower likelihood to revise donation upwards following negative lag 
relative  contributions,  and  downwards  following  positive  ones.  Equivalently,  these  findings  show  that 
individuals are more likely to conform to partners’ choices when the latter have higher status. The results on 
revision  amounts  go  in  the  same  direction,  but  regression  coefficients  on  the  interaction  terms  are  not 
significant.  
 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
 
In order to test whether the effect of relative status alone is responsible for the observed differences in 
leaders’ downward revision choices, I run t-tests of the likelihood to decrease donations,  (             ), 
following positive lag relative contributions,  (               ), when i is ranked higher than her partner, 
depending  on  whether  i  is  in  the  middle  or  in  the  top  group.  Middle-ranked  participants  revise  giving 
downward 54.5% of the times in such situations, while the corresponding figure for leaders is only 39.3%. 
This difference is statistically significant (p=.008). On the contrary, no significant differences are observed in 
upwards revision choices by leaders and middle group members following negative lag relative contributions 
(p=.564). Consistent with previous results on donation levels, leaders’ behavior appears to be driven by a 
combination  of  effects. There  exist  a  general tendency  by  higher-ranked  individuals  to  conform  less to 
partners’ choices, which is in line with predictions of upward social comparison models. In addition, leaders 
are even less likely than other higher-ranked participants to lower their contribution to match those of their 
partners’, a fact which could be explained by their higher valuation of the conservation project.    
We observed that lower-ranked members of a pair are more likely to conform to their partners’ 
choices than their higher-ranked counterparts. In order to test whether further differences in revision choices 
by lower-ranked participants exist depending on whether their partners are leaders, I show results from the 
following regressions, which focus exclusively of non-leaders (Table 17):  
 
                                         (               )                        
 (               )                                               (14a)   24 
                                          (               )                        
 (               )                                               (14b) 
 
The dependent variables are the same as in the previous tables. As above, regressions control for partner’s 
contribution  amount  in  t-1  and  individual  fixed-effect,  and  results  are  derived  using  linear  probability 
models. After giving less than their partners, participants are more likely to revise their donation upwards if 
partners are leaders than if they are not, and the amount of contribution increase is also higher in this case. 
However, neither effect is statistically significant. Similarly, there are no significant differences in downward 
revision choices depending on partner’s leadership status. 
 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
 
Non-leaders’  tendency  to conform  doesn’t  significantly  differ  depending  on  the  type  of  authority  made 
salient within the experiment. In particular, the likelihood that participants revise their donations upwards, 
after observing a higher-ranked partner contribute more, is higher when the moral ranking is salient (49%) 
than when it is not (42.5%), but this difference is not statistically significant (p=.232). 
  This  final  part  of  the  section  has  demonstrated  that  the  presence  of  leaders  in  a  pair  makes 
cooperation sustainable through the combination of two mechanisms. Individuals are in general less likely to 
conform to their partners’ choices when they are the higher-ranked members of their pair. Moreover, when 
paired with partners who donate lower amounts, leaders tend to decrease contributions even less frequently 
than  other  higher-ranked  participants.  The  next  section  checks  whether  the  results  presented  so  far  are 
determined by biases deriving from the ranking procedure used within the experiment.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
The ranking process that was used to divide participants into groups may have introduced biases in the 
attribution of status to participants. This section examines two main potential sources of bias. The first 
concerns the constraint imposed by the procedure, that status groups be equally-sized. The second derives 
from the relationship between leadership and friendship links among session participants. In what follows, I 
will provide evidence that demonstrates how the main results of this paper are not  a by-product of the 
ranking procedure used. On the contrary, the classification process may cause an under-estimation of true 
leadership effects. 
  By imposing exogenously that one-third of participants belong to the top group, one-third to the 
middle  group  and  the  remaining  third  to  the  bottom  group,  the  ranking  determined  exogenously  a 
discontinuity in ranking. It is likely that a ranking process, which left the size of groups unrestricted, would 
result  in  a  different  number  of  participants  classified  as  leaders.  In  order  to  investigate  whether  a 
misalignment between underlying leadership and status within the experiment exists, and what consequences   25 
it has on the empirical results, I examine the differences in behavior within groups and near the thresholds 
between status groups.  
  The  analysis  of  within-group  differences  in  contribution  is  possible  because  the  experimenter 
recorded the exact order in which participants were selected into the top two groups. Since the bottom group 
was defined in a residual way, no within group differences can be defined there. For the top and middle 
groups, therefore, we can explore whether individuals selected early on into the group behave differently 
than fellow group members nominated later. A simple distinction is between the first half of participants 
selected into the group and the remaining members of the same group. Figure 4 shows mean contribution of 
participants by absolute status, distinguishing between the top and the bottom half of each group. Focusing 
on the top group, we observe that those selected first as leaders give significantly more than those selected 
last (p=.013). The middle group displays an opposite pattern, i.e. the lower-ranked components of the group 
contribute on average significantly more than the higher-ranked ones (p=.002).  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
Within group differences in behavior can result from the fact that the qualities related with leadership are 
stronger among the individuals nominated first, and progressively get diluted as we move down the ranking. 
Since intrinsic valuation of local public goods is a prominent quality of leaders according to qualitative and 
survey data, this would explain the fact that ‘top leaders’ donate more to environmental conservation than all 
lower-ranked  participants.    Indeed,  once  we  control  for  observable  characteristics  of  participants,  the 
differences in giving between top and bottom-ranked members of a group lose significance, as shown by the 
results of the following regression:  
 
                                                               (15) 
 
where                is equal to 1 if i is in the top half of her group and 0 otherwise. Column 1 of Table 
18 considers top group members only, while Column 2 focuses on members of the middle group. Regression 
results tells us that within group differences in giving are primarily driven by individual characteristics 
correlated with ranking order. Although not significant, the negative coefficients on the                   
dummies suggest that giving by lower-ranked members of a group is higher than that by their fellow group 
members, once their individual characteristics are controlled for. This result is consistent with psychological 
theories of counterfactual thinking. According to this perspective, for lowest-ranked individuals within a 
group the most salient counterfactual is represented by members of the lower status group (because they 
could have easily ended there). Their behavior would therefore be driven by a feeling of being role models 
for  those  ranked  below,  rather  than  by  a  feeling  of  relative  deprivation  for  not  having  reached  higher 
positions in the ranking. The positive correlation existing between relative ranking and giving, found in the 
previous section (Result 1), further supports this argument.   26 
 
[Insert Table 18 here] 
 
The differences in contribution levels between participants in the lower half of the top group and those in the 
upper half of the middle group, significant when we run a simple t-test (p=.002), also lose significance once 
we control for individuals characteristics. A similar regression to (15) is run, focusing this time only on 
participants around the status threshold between top and middle group: 
 
                                                                   (16) 
 
where                      is equal to 1 if i is in the top half of the middle group and to 0 if i is in the 
bottom half of the top group. The results, presented in Table 19, show that there is no statistically significant 
difference in contribution between the lowest-ranked among the leaders and the highest-ranked within the 
middle group, once we control for individual characteristics. This finding further reassures us of the ability 
of the ranking to reflect actual differences in individual characteristics.  
 
[Insert Table 19 here] 
 
The  presence  of  within-group  differences  in  giving  has  relevant  implications,  especially  in  terms  of 
leadership  effects.  If  the  ranking  process  led  to  the  inclusion  of  individuals  with  progressively  weaker 
leadership profiles into the top group, then the leadership effects observed here are lower bounds of what we 
would observe, had the selection into the leaders’ group been restricted to fewer individuals.  
  I now turn to examining the second potential source of bias generated by the ranking process. By 
accepting as candidates in the top two groups only those nominated by fellow session participants, the 
ranking may have induced the selection of leaders on the basis of friendship networks rather than individual 
qualities. If this were the case, the fact that leaders do not adjust their contributions to match lower ones by 
non-leaders, while non-leaders revise giving upwards in order to conform to leaders, could be a consequence 
of the effect of friendship on influence. This outcome would result if individuals were more inclined to 
conform to the choices of friends than of strangers, if those, whom leaders consider friends, belonged to their 
own group, and if, concurrently, lower-ranked participants had more friends in the top group than in other 
groups. Table 20 shows average number of friends by status group among leaders and non-leaders. Overall, 
leaders say to have fewer friends also attending the session than non-leaders. This difference is mainly due to 
the smaller number of friends that leaders declare to have among lower-ranked participants, relative to non-
leaders. The difference between leaders and non-leaders in the number of top-ranked friends mentioned is 
also small and not significant.  
 
[Insert Table 20 here]   27 
 
Table 20 shows that leaders do not appear to have significantly fewer friends among non-leaders than lower-
ranked participants, and that non-leaders have only slightly more friends among leaders than top-ranked 
participants. This is preliminary evidence against the possibility that experimental results be driven by status-
specific network differences. Still, we wish to check whether differences in friendship relationships can 
account  for  the  differences  we  observe  in  contributions  depending  on  absolute  and  relative  status.  If 
individuals contribute to the conservation project because it can be beneficial to their friends, the more so the 
needier their friends are, then giving should be increasing in the number of lower-ranked friends. Moreover, 
if donations are believed to please friends who will benefit from them, then we expect giving to respond to 
partner’s group, depending on the number of friends one has in that group. I test these predictions through 
the following regressions: 
 
                                                           
                                                                 (18a) 
                                                                                        
                                                                
                                                                                                     (18b) 
 
where (18a) examines how contribution by individual i at time t depends on the number of friends i has 
among leaders (               ) and non-leaders (                  ), controlling for contribution in 
the  private  decision,  partner’s  donation  in  t-1,  individual  characteristics  (including  absolute  status)  and 
session fixed-effects. Regression formula (18b) adds to these variables dummies equal to 1 if i’s partner at 
time t is a leader (                ), and interaction terms between partner’s status and number of friends i 
has  in  the  corresponding  status  category  (                                    and 
                                     ). The constant in (18b) captures average contribution when i’s 
partner is not a leader, and regression coefficients reflect deviations from this baseline contribution level. 
  Table 21 shows results from (18a) in Column 1 and from (18b) in Column 2. The number of friends 
among leaders and non-leaders does not appear to significantly affect contributions, nor does the interaction 
between partner’s status and number of friends  i has in the corresponding status group. These findings 
demonstrate that leadership effects are not driven by the influence of friendship networks on status and 
giving. 
 
[Insert Table 21 here] 
 
Overall, the results presented in this section reassure us of the ability of ranking within the experiment to 
reflect leadership status within the community, and mitigate concerns that leadership effects observed here   28 
may  be  a  by-product  of  the  specific  ranking  procedure  used.  On  the  contrary,  the  ranking  process,  by 
assigning leadership status to as many as one-third of participants, may have attenuated its effects. 
 
7. Mechanisms 
This section reviews the experimental results with the purpose of interpreting them in light of existing 
theories of social preferences, learning and social comparison. In the course of the analysis, evidence in 
support or against specific perspectives will be offered. This section is not meant to offer an exhaustive 
account of all theoretical perspectives that can account for the empirical results presented so far. The goal of 
this review is simply to focus on specific theoretical frameworks and discuss their consistency with the 
experimental data. 
A common framework used in economics to explain social influence is offered by models of learning 
(Conlisk, 1980; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Under this perspectives, individuals conform 
because others’ choices convey information about the value of alternative outcomes under consideration. The 
heterogeneity in the tendency to conform that we observe between leaders and non-leaders can be explained 
by assuming that information conveyed by leaders’ choices is more valuable, and thus individuals conform 
more to the actions of leaders than of lower-ranked peers. If learning were the only mechanism at work, we 
would observe a decreasing marginal effect of information, reflected in the likelihood that observing others’ 
choices induces individuals to revise their own. Observing a decreasing frequency of revisions over time 
would, therefore, be evidence of the role of learning within the experiment. The frequency of revisions is 
77.8%,  77.1%,  78.1%  and  79.1%  in  the  first,  second,  third  and  fourth  round  respectively.  Rather  than 
decreasing,  the  frequency  of  revisions  increases  over  time,  which  is  evidence  against  the  presence  of 
powerful learning effects within the experiment.  
Signaling  theories  of  altruism  also  predict  a  positive  correlation  between  own  and  others’ 
contribution,  stronger  when  the  latter  are  of  higher  status  (Glazer  &  Konrad,  1996;  Harbaugh,  1998). 
According to these models, agents’ pro-social behavior is motivated by the desire to gain approval from their 
peers.  Such  desire  is  stronger  the  more  respected  their  peers  are.  In  the  setting  of  this  study,  these 
assumptions imply that low status participants contribute to the public good in order to impress their high 
status partners. Upon observing their high-ranked counterparts contribute less than they did, and realizing 
that approval could be bought more cheaply, they reduce their donations. The same framework predicts the 
low tendency to conform to the choices of lower-ranked partners on the part of leaders. The role of giving as 
a signal of desirable qualities to others depends on the fact that contribution choices are observable. When 
they are not, the signaling motive to contribute disappears. In order to test whether this motive is at work 
within the experiment, individual contributions are compared depending on whether they are observable or 
not. Table 22 shows results from the following regressions: 
 
                                                                         (19a) 
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                                                                (19b) 
 
where (19a) regresses i’s contribution at time t on whether the choice was observed, partner’s contribution at 
t-1 and individual fixed-effects (Column 1), while (19b) tests whether the effect of observability depends on 
i’s partner being a leader (Column 2). Regression results show that contribution amounts are not significantly 
higher depending on whether choice is observed or not. The status of the partner also doesn’t matter. These 
findings  are  inconsistent with the  presence  of signaling  motives  behind  participants’  choices.  However, 
signaling models claim that individuals care about projecting a good image not just to others, but also to 
themselves (Benabou & Tirole, 2006). Unfortunately the available data does not allow testing whether self-
signaling motives are relevant within the experiment. 
 
[Insert Table 22 here] 
 
Theories of inequity aversion make predictions consistent with the empirical findings of this study: after 
observing others’ contribution amounts, individuals revise their choices so as to minimize payoff inequality. 
Moreover, these models assume that agents are more averse to disadvantageous inequality, and thus more 
likely to reduce giving after learning that their partners earned more, than to increase it after learning that 
their partners earned less. Although no formal test exists of whether inequity aversion is at work within the 
experiment,  a  remark  can  be  made.  According  to  inequity  aversion  theory,  we  would  expect  revisions 
choices by bottom group members to be correlated with the perceived income of top-ranked individuals: if 
top group members are believed to be the richest in the community, then by earning more than  others 
through the experiment they would further increase inequality. Inequality would be reduced instead if leaders 
were believed to be the poorest in the community. In the survey, participants were asked if they thought that 
top  group  members  were  among  the  richest  people  in  the  community.  Only  24%  of  bottom-ranked 
participants answered affirmatively to this question. Moreover, the probability that low status participants 
decrease  giving  in  t  after  learning  that  their  top-ranked  partners  gave  less  than  they  did  in  t-1,  is  not 
correlated with the belief that top-ranked partners are rich.  
  As for reciprocity models, the asymmetry we observe in revision patterns is consistent with what 
Charness and Rabin (2002) call ‘concern withdrawal’: individuals do not display strong positive reciprocity, 
but are quick to withdraw their concern for other agents’ wellbeing when the latter act uncooperatively. This 
theoretical framework can account for the fact that participants to the experiment tend to revise giving 
downwards more than upwards, and for the absence of effects of observability.  
In order to explain why the tendency to conform to others’ actions is negatively correlated with 
individuals absolute and relative ranking, all theories reviewed so far need to be combined with models of 
social comparison, which argue that agents look upwards on the status ladder when assessing their own 
behavior. Survey data confirm that participants’ opinions on their own ability to influence others depend on   30 
status: asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 4 - where 1 is ‘very’ and 4 is ‘not at all’- how much influence they 
had  on  community  outcomes,  leaders  and  non-leaders’  mean  answers  were  on  average  1.4  and  1.7 
respectively. Such difference is statistically significant (p=.011), even more so if we focus on moral leaders 
(p=.006), whose answer was 1.3 on average.
7 
The only models that do not require to be complemented by social comparison theories , in order to 
account for the different behavioral patterns that we observe in the data, ar e social norms and conformity 
models. There, the asymmetry between upward and downward revision amounts results from that between 
honor from complying with the norm and shame from deviating from it. Moreover,  the presence of 
differences in honor and stigma depending on individual status would justify the different revision patters by 
leaders and non-leaders. Honor from complying could be decreasing in status, thus explaining lower-ranked 
willingness to revise contributions upwards upon observing higher -ranked partners donate more. On the 
other hand, the shame from not contributing could be increasing in status, which would  explain why leaders 
fail to conform to lower-ranked partners who contribute lower amounts. The presence of context-dependent 
social norms has been demonstrated by empirical studies (Krupka & Weber, 2010), showing how people’s 
opinions  on  what  is  appropriate  behavior  are  strongly  dependent  on  the  decision  environment.  Since 
differences across, and within, groups enter the definition of participants’ choice environment in the setting 
of this study, theories of social norms would predict them to be associated with heterogeneities in individual 
behavior. 
To  summarize,  among  social  preference  theories,  some  appear  to  perform  better  than  others  in 
explaining the main empirical findings of this study. In particular, theories of conformism and social norms, 
and a combination of reciprocity and social comparison models appear to be capable of explaining the larger 
set  of  empirical  findings  from  this  study.  This  is,  of  course,  no  conclusive  evidence  in  favor  of  one 
perspective over others. On the contrary, different mechanisms may combine to produce observed behavior. 
Further experiments would be needed to formally test the predictive power of the different theories reviewed 
in this section. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Through a novel methodological approach, combining a participatory ranking exercise, which identified 
different types of existing leaders within the community, and a public-good game, in which participants 
contributed to an actual biodiversity conservation project, this paper has shown that the presence of leaders is 
associated with higher and more stable contributions by the group over time. First, leaders give more, and 
this by itself makes total pair contribution significantly higher when leaders are part of it. Second, top-ranked 
individuals show a low tendency to conform to (lower) partners’ contribution. These results are driven by the 
                                                           
7 While social comparison theories can account for leadership effects in giving and revision choices, they cannot 
explain the fact that bottom-ranked participants within a group contribute more than top-ranked members of the same 
group. We noted that theories of counterfactual thinking can explain why participants, who just missed-out being in a 
lower group, tend to compare themselves primarily to lower-ranked peers and feel the responsibility of being role 
models for them, much in the same way as leaders feel towards non-leaders. While interesting, this effect is not 
significant once individual characteristics are controlled for.   31 
combination of leaders’ high valuation of the local public good provided through their donations, and of a 
general positive relationship between relative status and giving, both on average and over time. These effects 
are  enhanced  when  leadership  is  defined  along  a  dimension  that  is  relevant  for  the  decision  under 
consideration.  The  results  also  show  that,  beyond  the  general  relationship  between  relative  status  and 
behavior, non-leaders’ actions do not significantly vary depending on whether their partners are leaders. 
It is an established fact in sociology and economics that innovation processes take off when opinion 
leaders  and  highly  connected  individuals  decide  to  adopt  (Rogers,  1962;  Katz  &  Lazarsfeld,  1955).  In 
practice, identifying these key individuals in unfamiliar settings may be challenging and costly. This study 
presents a solution to the targeting problems, by demonstrating how a simple ranking exercise can help 
identify natural leaders within a community. The empirical results presented here suggest that the identity of 
effective leaders depends on the nature of the decision under consideration. For leaders to feel responsibility 
as role models, it is therefore crucial that they are selected on the basis of characteristics salient to the 
specific issue at hand. Once these conditions are fulfilled, this study suggests that interventions targeted to 
local leaders, for instance environmental education programs, may have a significant impact on the broader 
community.  
The  results  from  this  study  go  against  conventional  wisdom  in  development  economics.  The 
literature on community driven development warns against the risk of elite capture of development programs 
and looks at the power of local elites as a negative factor. I show instead that elites can play a positive role. 
This result may depend on the way leaders are selected within the experiment or on other social and cultural 
features of the study area. Indeed, the ranking process provided legitimacy to leaders in the context of the 
experiment.  Testing  the  robustness  of  the  experimental  findings  to  leaders’  selection  process  and 
characteristics could be an interesting direction for further research. 
Generalizability of the results could be interestingly explored along two other dimensions, which 
would address limitations of this study. First, the positive role played by local leaders in the experiment may 
depend  on  specific  features  of  the  experimental  design.  In  particular,  before  deciding  how  much  to 
contribute, participants discussed the qualities of top group members for each ranking. By spelling out what 
was expected of them, this discussion may have influenced top group members’ behavior. The notion that 
placing responsibility for the common good in the hands of local elites could have a positive effect on their 
conduct has great policy relevance and would deserve further empirical testing.  
Second, this study shows that social status affects choices when individuals face a decision with a 
strong  normative  content. The  ‘right’ choice there  depends  more  on  ethical concerns  than  on  objective 
considerations. Still, the experiment faces participants with a decision whose outcomes are uncertain. Under 
this respect, the decision environment within the experiment is similar to those confronting farmers when 
they take information-based choices, such as technology and innovation adoption. An additional direction for 
further research would explore the role of leadership for behavior transmission in decision contexts with 
varying ethical and informational contents.   32 
Besides its limitations and possible extensions, this research is the first to identify the effect of 
different types of naturally occurring leadership on group cooperation. Field experiments offer a unique 
opportunity to investigate long-term determinants of the voluntary provision to public goods in a natural 
environment. This experiment demonstrates that the presence of leaders can lead to improvements in group 
cooperation,  especially  if  leadership  is  based  on  criteria  relevant  to  group  decisions  and  on  legitimate 
selection processes.   33 
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Figure 4. Within group differences in contribution 
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Table 1. Structure of session 
Decision  Round  Partner 
1  Private   
2-3-4  1  A 
5-6-7  2  B 
8-9-10  3  C 
11-12-13  4  D 
 
Table 2. Decision environment within rounds 












 choice of round  Y  N  Y 
2
nd
 choice of round  Y  Y  Y 
3
rd
 choice of round  Y  Y  N 
 
Table 3. Participants’ characteristics 
           Mean  Std. Dev. 
            n = 251   
 Age   41.94  [14.93] 
 Female (%)   39.84  [.49] 
 Household size   5.16  [2.11] 
 No education (%)   10.36  [.31] 
 Primary school (%)   41.83  [.49] 
 Secondary school (%)   40.64  [.49] 
 More than secondary school (%)  7.1  [.26] 
 Individual income, previous week (Pesos)    35,146  [56,397] 
 Farming main source  of income (%)  65.74  [.48] 
 Farm size (he)  2.34  [6.55] 
 Owns livestock (%)   10.44  [.31] 
 Suffered income loss due to environmental shock, previous year (%)  78.09  [.41] 
 Number of session participants who say ID is friend or relative  3.65  [3.19] 
 Number of community associations in which ID has a leadership role  .339  [.60] 
 Member of ASPROCIG (%)  56.97  [.49] 
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Formal authority ranking  1 
    Moral authority ranking  0.351*  1 
  Traditional authority ranking  0.130*  -0.149*  1.0000 
      Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1% 
 
Table 5. Characteristics correlated with status 







authority rank  Average rank 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age               0.037***  0.065***  0.021*  0.063*** 
                  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Female            -0.774**  -0.581*  -0.125  -0.830*** 
                  (0.317)  (0.329)  (0.281)  (0.281) 
Married           0.252  -0.216  -0.357  -0.178 
                  (0.346)  (0.403)  (0.364)  (0.325) 
HH dependency ratio  0.224  0.248  -0.070  0.252 
                  (0.272)  (0.195)  (0.228)  (0.208) 
No children in HH  0.431  -0.298  -0.313  0.021 
                  (0.504)  (0.510)  (0.462)  (0.493) 
Primary education  1.587***  1.039*  -0.660  0.990** 
                  (0.548)  (0.542)  (0.589)  (0.463) 
Secondary education  2.725***  1.663***  -0.124  2.215*** 
                  (0.657)  (0.595)  (0.636)  (0.524) 
More than secondary education  4.013***  3.600***  -1.377  2.770*** 
                  (0.905)  (0.979)  (0.912)  (0.828) 
HH income per capita over previous week (000 
Pesos)  0.014  0.012  0.007  0.016 
                  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Number of session participants who say ID is 
friend or relative 
0.120***  0.183***  0.054  0.176*** 
(0.046)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.042) 
Number of community associations in which ID 
has a leadership role 
1.090***  0.190  0.394*  1.029*** 
(0.313)  (0.265)  (0.213)  (0.286) 
Member of ASPROCIG  -0.624*  -0.657*  -0.052  -0.808** 
                  (0.354)  (0.359)  (0.321)  (0.335) 
Session fixed-effects  x  x  x  x 
Number of Obs     251  251  251  251 
Pseudo R-squared  0.177  0.140  0.038  0.136 
Note: Ordered logit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. Characteristics correlated with contribution 
                  Dependent variable 
                  Ci private 
Avg Ci                   
(Round 1-4) 
   (1)  (2) 
Age               -28.189  -16.663 
                  (27.939)  (23.112) 
Female            34.609  -0.131 
                  (657.014)  (539.432) 
Married           792.991  850.110 
                  (736.237)  (596.784) 
HH dependency ratio  -847.703  -484.722 
                  (565.130)  (530.083) 
No children in HH  -1827.128*  -564.614 
                  (1011.780)  (826.932) 
Primary education  -808.227  430.157 
                  (1220.035)  (1117.748) 
Secondary education  -416.414  1348.755 
                  (1422.804)  (1266.919) 
More than secondary education  -231.710  1031.941 
                  (1909.158)  (1756.634) 
HH income per capita over previous week (000 Pesos)  17.065  25.675 
                  (23.124)  (21.199) 
Number of session participants who say ID is friend or 
relative 
-57.667  50.812 
(97.889)  (82.372) 
Number of community associations in which ID has a 
leadership role 
267.468  224.303 
(573.127)  (516.249) 
Member of ASPROCIG  1441.665**  1452.707** 
 
(692.492)  (572.798) 
Constant  675.138**  1691.230 
                  (2185.343)  (1613.899) 
Session fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     251  251 
R-squared  0.293  0.409 
 Note: Linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  
 * significant at 1%. 
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Table 7. Total pair contribution by pair composition 
   Dependent variable 
                  Total pair contribution 
   (1) 
Pair features at least one leader  1694.548*** 
                  (469.787) 
Constant  6402.576*** 
                  (595.157) 
Session fixed-effects  x 
Number of Obs     1791 
Number of Clusters  251 
R-squared         0.414 
         Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
   parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 8. Leadership and individual contribution 
   Dependent variable 
                  Contribution 
   (1)  (2) 
Leader  1112.831**  850.697 
                  (555.550)  (635.719) 
Constant  3314.099***  2358.563* 




Session fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     3262  3262 
Number of Clusters  251  251 
R-squared         0.278  0.301 
   Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
   parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
   in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
   relative, and ASPROCIG membership. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 9. Higher relative status and contribution, individual fixed-effects 
   Dependent variable 
   Contribution 
                  (1) 
Higher rank  286.177** 
                  (127.168) 
Constant  6773.655*** 
                  (71.115) 
Individual fixed-effects  x 
Number of Obs     3262 
R-squared         0.020 
     Note: Linear regression with fixed-effect estimator. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
     * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 10. Contribution, relative and absolute status  
   Dependent variable 
   Contribution 
                  (1) 
Higher rank  1733.036*** 
                  (414.924) 
Leader  1205.207* 
                  (727.573) 
Middle rank  623.835 
 
(551.528) 
Higher rank*Leader  -1630.455*** 
                  (442.896) 
Higher rank*Middle rank  -1761.525*** 
 
(463.007) 
Constant  2120.446 
                  (1396.808) 
Individual characteristics  x 
Session fixed effects  x 
Number of Obs     3262 
Number of Clusters  251 
R-squared         0.305 
   Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
   parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
   in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
   relative, and ASPROCIG membership. * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 11. Contribution among non-leaders, by partner’s status 
 
   Dependent variable 
                  Contribution 
   (1)  (2) 
Non-Leader  -1165.471**  -903.635 
                  (554.387)  (633.122) 
Partner Leader  -103.179  -102.798 
 
(154.774)  (154.832) 
Non Leader*Partner leader  176.661  177.582 
 
(214.683)  (214.948) 
Constant  4457.533***  3239.405** 




Session fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     3262  3262 
Number of Clusters  251  251 
R-squared         0.278  0.302 
        Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.  
        Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations in which i holds leadership  
        roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, and ASPROCIG membership.  
        * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 12. Total pair contribution by type of leadership salient 
 
   Dependent variable 
                  Total pair contribution 
   (1) 
Moral leadership salient  2420.960*** 
                  (601.010) 
Constant  5043.476*** 
                  (291.364) 
Session fixed-effects  x 
Number of Obs     1791 
Number of Clusters  251 
R-squared         0.406 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
    parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 13. Total pair contribution over time, by pair composition 
 
   Dependent variable 
                  Total pair contribution 
   (1)  (2) 
Pair features at least one leader  649.074  602.617 
                  (538.900)  (540.681) 
Decision (t)  -69.678  -382.337*** 
 
(45.396)  (125.519) 
Pair features at least one leader*Decision (t)  114.752*  121.034* 
 
(62.103)  (62.274) 
Constant  6918.722***  10839.754*** 




Session fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     3010  3010 
R-squared         0.414  0.415 
   Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
   * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 14. Contribution revision by lag relative contribution 
 
   Dependent variable 
  




   (1)  (2) 
Gave more than partner in t-1  -0.154***  0.219*** 
                  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Gave less than partner in t-1  0.215***  -0.171*** 
                  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Constant  0.288***  0.336*** 
 
(0.026)  (0.027) 
Individual fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     2008  2008 
R-squared  0.122  0.126 
     Note: Linear probability fixed-effect model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
     * significant at 1%. 
   Table 15. Leadership and contribution revision 
 














   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Leader  -370.779  0.017  -115.848  0.026 
                  (225.771)  (0.029)  (236.724)  (0.037) 
Gave less than partner in t-1  677.073***  0.346***     
                  (204.746)  (0.032)     
Leader*Gave less  -17.716  -0.055     
 
(320.127)  (0.051)     
Gave more than partner in t-1      2022.197***  0.399*** 
                      (236.861)  (0.031) 
Leader*Gave more      -587.138*  -0.138*** 
                      (320.199)  (0.050) 
Constant  793.078***  0.232***  335.282  0.247*** 
 
(295.595)  (0.055)  (276.911)  (0.061) 
Session fixed-effects  x  x  x  x 
Individual controls  x  x  x  x 
Number of Obs     1288  2008  1380  2008 
Number of Clusters  251  251  251  251 
R-squared  0.081  0.094  0.154  0.117 
Note:  Random  effect  model  with  GLS  estimator.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  the  individual  level  in  parentheses.  Individual 
characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations in which  i holds leadership roles, number of 
participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, ASPROCIG membership, private contribution and lag partner 
contribution. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 16. Higher relative status and contribution revision 
 














   OLS 
Linear 
probability  OLS 
Linear 
probability 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Higher rank  -99.662  0.004  186.167  0.039 
                  (220.488)  (0.031)  (218.605)  (0.033) 
Gave less than partner in t-1  690.319***  0.418***     
                  (215.031)  (0.031)     
Higher rank*Gave less  -250.190  -0.089**     
 
(298.650)  (0.044)     
Gave more than partner in t-1      1880.184***  0.450*** 
                      (213.109)  (0.031) 
Higher rank*Gave more      -315.404  -0.086* 
                      (287.742)  (0.045) 
Constant  1201.033***  0.225***  248.549  0.065** 
 
(150.132)  (0.021)  (225.197)  (0.032) 
Individual fixed-effects  x  x  x  x 
Number of Obs     1288  2008  1380  2008 
R-squared  0.028  0.120  0.074  0.127 
Note: Linear regression fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 1%. 
 
   Table 17. Contribution revision of non-leaders, by partner’s status 
 














   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Partner leader  -4.423  -0.016  105.589  0.035 
                  (270.791)  (0.035)  (251.039)  (0.034) 
Gave less than partner in t-1  479.797*  0.400***     
                  (273.864)  (0.038)     
Partner leader*Gave less  129.885  0.028     
 
(360.380)  (0.052)     
Gave more than partner in t-1      2026.313***  0.471*** 
                      (285.923)  (0.038) 
Partner leader*Gave more      24.434  -0.009 
                      (363.435)  (0.053) 
Constant  1230.815***  0.221***  235.728  0.047 
 
(178.563)  (0.024)  (280.841)  (0.036) 
Individual fixed-effects  x  x  x  x 
Number of Obs     848  1344  914  1344 
R-squared  0.028  0.130  0.084  0.154 
Note: Linear regression fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * 




Table 18. Within-group differences in contribution 
   Dependent variable 
   Contribution 
   Top group  Middle group 
   (1)  (2) 
Top half group  -147.762  -634.577 
 
(597.453)  (678.082) 
Constant  -3069.344*  2734.291 
 
(1636.405)  (2490.071) 
Session fixed-effects  x  x 
Individual characteristics  x  x 
Number of Obs     664  671 
Number of Clusters  251  251 
R-squared  0.683  0.435 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
    parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
    in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
    relative, ASPROCIG membership, private contribution and lag partner contribution.  
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Table 19. Differences in contribution between bottom half of leaders’ group  








Top half - Middle group  208.235 
 
(537.867) 
Constant  -538.975 
 
(1768.173) 
Session fixed-effects  x 
Individual characteristics  x 
Number of Obs  671 
R-squared  0.576 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
    parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
    in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
    relative, and ASPROCIG membership, private contribution and lag partner contribution.  





Table 20. Friendship networks by status 
 
   Leaders  Not Leaders  p-value 
Total number of friends  5.16  5.47  .398 
Number of friends in leaders’ group  2.19  2.28  .655 
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Table 21. Contribution and friendship networks 
 
   Dependent variable 
                  Contribution 
   (1)  (2) 
Number of friends in leaders' group  -17.019  -15.716 
                  (175.009)  (183.417) 
Number of friends not in leaders' group  -75.253  -40.363 
 
(119.041)  (118.901) 
Partner is leader    -148.803 
 
  (318.702) 
Number of friends in leaders' group*Partner leader    -6.353 
 
  (104.141) 
Number of friends not in leaders' group*Partner not 
leader    -53.455 
 
  (70.273) 
Constant  -1410.246  -1344.836 
                  (1422.767)  (1431.204) 
Individual characteristics  x  x 
Session fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     1999  1999 
Number of clusters  251  251 
R-squared         0.465  0.466 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.  
    Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations in which i holds leadership  
    roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, ASPROCIG membership, private contribution,  
    lag partner contribution and absolute status. * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 22. Contribution and choice observability 
 
   Dependent variable 
                  Contribution 
                  OLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2) 
Choice observed  32.374  45.033 
                  (124.752)  (153.026) 
Partner is leader    16.551 
 
  (192.977) 
Choice observed*Partner is leader    -37.832 
 
  (264.339) 
Constant  5964.803***  5959.084*** 
                  (134.397)  (145.875) 
Individual fixed-effects  x  x 
Number of Obs     2007  2007 
(Pseudo) R-squared         0.029  0.029 
Note: Linear regression fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 1%. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Top 5 qualities of top-ranked individuals, by ranking type 
Formal authority ranking   
Are active in the community, think about the common good  22% 
Have experience, knowledge and capacity to solve community problems   15% 
Are in good relationships with the mayor   13% 
Are leaders, influential people in the community   8% 
Are trusted, respected   8% 
Know the problems of the community   8% 
Moral authority ranking   
Speak well, have good argument, are persuasive   23% 
Are diplomatic, pacific, conciliatory    21% 
Have moral qualities: responsible, serious, honest, determined   12% 
Are in good relationships with community members   11% 
Have experience, knowledge, capacity to solve community problems   10% 
Traditional authority ranking   
Are happy and funny   24% 
Are talented, have charisma    19% 
Are extroverted and enthusiastic   15% 
They have experience and skills, know many stories   14% 
They are dynamic and creative   10% 
Note: Percentages are derived from the ratio between the number of times a certain quality was mentioned in the discussion and the 
total number of qualities mentioned. 